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THE STOCKHOLDER'S REMEDY OF CORPORATE D1ssoLUTION. By James 
O'Malley Tingle. Missoula, Montana. Montana State University Press. 
1959. Pp. 238. $12. 
The availability to minority shareholders of the remedy of involuntary 
corporate dissolution has been one of the truly gray areas of corporation 
law. Whether dissolution was sought as relief from majority oppression or 
as escape from the corporate paralysis of a director deadlock, courts have 
viewed it as a harsh and drastic sanction, one to be invoked, if at all, only 
in the most critical of situations. Indeed, for many years judicial pro-
nouncements were abundant that equity had no jurisdiction to dissolve 
corporations even where majority oppression was fraudulent. Although the 
face of the law is changing in this respect, the advance of judicial policy, 
as Professor Laylin James observes in the foreword to this volume, "is likely 
to be a slow tortuous development .... " 
The present status of the availability of the remedy, both at common 
law and under governing statutory provisions, reflects no marked degree 
of judicial harmony. The attorney's task of presenting an intelligent and 
convincing argument, either for or against the invocation of the remedy, is 
difficult indeed. The author has made that task an easier one. 
Mr. Tingle's book presents three significant contributions to practicing 
attorneys and students dealing with this troublesome question: (1) a care-
ful background analysis, both in terms of the common law and modern 
statutes; (2) an exhaustive and yet clear and concise treatment of many of 
the leading cases; (3) a common-sense approach to proposed legislative 
changes. 
The first of the volume's five chapters traces, in terms of majority op• 
pression, the historical development of equity's role in granting relief, via 
dissolution, to minority shareholders. Well aware of the continuing judi-
cial resistance to invocation of the remedy, the author is nevertheless quick 
to observe that courts are increasingly receptive if the requested relief will 
serve to "enforce the duty of honest management even to the extremity of 
liquidation." (p. 36) Although noting that the "trend is clearly toward the 
remedy," (p. 41) Tingle emphasizes that relief will be denied unless the 
harm complained of is directly affecting a vital and material aspect of 
corporate operation. In short, the mismanagement or oppression must be 
of major proportions; disagreement on relatively minor matters, even in 
deadlock situations, will not merit sufficient consideration to invoke the 
chancellor's affirmative action. 
The problem of deadlock, peculiar to close corporations, is given ex-
tensive treatment by the author. Appropriate distinction is made between 
situations wherein the board is deadlocked through equal division of con-
trolling shares ("complete deadlock") and situations wherein shareholders 
cannot agree on an odd-numbered directorate so that the old directors hold 
over ("incomplete deadlock"). In the latter situation it is obvious that, 
inasmuch as the voting strength is equally divided, there is purely fortuitous 
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control of the board of directors. Yet relief has been denied on the ground 
that such a corporation was a "solvent, prosperous, going organization, 
with a full board of directors governing its affairs."1 The author rightly 
criticizes such an approach as imposing an unjust penalty upon sharehold-
ers by forcing them to act at their peril. Such cases, he observes, "make 
gamblers of stockholders of close corporations with holdover boards: if 
there is a deadlock of stockholders exclusive control devolves upon that 
faction fortuitously represented by a majority of the board, and the other 
faction loses." (p. 108) 
After discussing in detail the leading deadlock cases, the author pre-
sents a summary of the common-law theories of liquidation used in various 
jurisdictions. This summary should prove to be of practical value to attor-
neys as an organizational guide. Equally cogent treatment is accorded to 
modern deadlock statutes and their application. 
Perhaps the most controversial portion of Tingle's book, at least to legis~ 
lators and students of this area of corporation law, will be the critique of 
existing legislation and the proposals for change. First of all, present 
statutory standards of liquidation are criticized as being too broad and too 
vague. The answer may be given that broad and vague standards permit 
judges "running room" in applying governing statutes in the most equitable 
manner. But the author feels that the price of such flexibility is too high. 
He fears an uncalled-for continuation of judicial hostility to the remedy. 
"They [ the judges] will remain relatively free, even in the face of proved 
incorrigibility, to apply traditional alternatives in lieu of liquidation." 
(p. 176) Accordingly, Mr. Tingle advocates express legislation of a definite 
nature as the best route to genuine effectiveness of the remedy. 
The legislative proposals of the author provide for dissolution in both 
complete and incomplete deadlock situations. His standards for invocation 
of the remedy represent an advance in both clarity and effectiveness: "when 
those in continuing control of the corporation have by illegal, fraudulent, 
oppressive, or other action or inaction demonstrated that they can no longer 
be trusted to control the corporation in good faith toward all of its stock-
holders." (p. 180) 
Mr. Tingle, however, wisely does not limit his proposed changes to a 
formulation of standards. Instead, he provides for practical alternatives 
short of liquidation. The plaintiff, for example, is granted the right to 
withdraw his investment whenever the corporate business is endangered by 
an oppressive majority or whenever he is excluded from participation in 
executive management. (p. 196) Similarly, receivership, dissolution and 
liquidation may be avoided through a purchase of the plaintiff's shares by 
the controlling faction. Determination of value is by the court or court-
appointed appraisers, thus mitigating the danger of a purchase of the 
oppressed stockholder's shares at forced sale prices. (p. 204) 
1 Hepner v. Miller, 130 Colo. 243, 246-47, 274 P.2d 818, 819 (1954). 
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Mr. Tingle's book is scholarly throughout. More than that, it is loaded
with practicality from cover to cover. It represents a real contribution to
a phase of corporation law heretofore lacking in topflight coverage.
Hugh L. Sowards,
Professor of Law,
University of Miami
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